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School choice is the current educational reform man-
tra, especially for conservative critics of public education. 
Competition putatively will improve educational quality, 
drive down educational costs, and ultimately create a more 
dynamic educational system.  Whether or not the choice 
theory holds is questionable. Although experiments in mar-
ket competition are increasing, no clear evidence exists to 
show that market-driven systems result in enhanced student 
achievement. The critical question is:  Does choice result in 
more educationally advantageous approaches for America’s 
most vulnerable students—the students who are poor, of 
color, and reside in urban environments? This question looms 
large over educational policymakers because school choice 
schemes are an increasingly popular strategy for urban school 
reform; choice schemes are almost nonexistent in suburban 
and rural areas. School choice is in essence an issue of ur-
ban schools. 
Many of the historic public school structures created 
for K-12 students have failed to deliver on implicit prom-
ises (Tyack and Cuban, 1995), necessitating strong calls for 
school reform. That failure is most pronounced in America’s 
urban secondary schools. The comprehensive secondary 
school has served America’s rich and poor for decades. 
Unfortunately, a one-size-fits-all school has not accommo-
dated a significant segment of America’s minority and low 
income population who are disproportionately enrolled in 
inner city (and typically high poverty and highly diverse) 
schools. For example, within the 61 largest urban school 
systems in this country, almost 77% of the students in 2001- 
2002 were African American, Hispanic, or other students of 
color; this proportion compares to about 38% in all schools 
across the country (Council of Great City Schools, 2004). 
Of students in these largest urban systems, 63% were eli-
gible for free lunch subsidy in 2001-2002, compared to about 
40% of students across the country (Council of Great City 
Schools, 2004). And, African-American, Latino, and Native 
American students dropped out of schools in absurdly large 
numbers (in excess of 50 percent in many urban environ-
ments).  Even for white students in affluent areas the gradu-
ation rates are often distressingly low.  And, while it is true 
that many students drop out and then secure a GED, it is 
equally true that serious questions arise as to whether a GED 
equates to a traditional diploma. 
Enter Friedman and a myriad of neoconservative choice 
advocates.  For Friedman and other market theorists, parent 
choice is the golden coin of the educational realm.  Ostensi-
bly, they do not oppose public schools; rather, they argue 
for a wide variety of for-profit, charter, parochial and gov-
ernment schools.  Some choice advocates agree that the com-
petition may initially create unevenness in quality, but over 
time those in poor urban environments will benefit from what 
those with affluence have demanded—better schools.  Fried-
man captures the idea through an analog: 
Throughout history, hasn’t the relationship been just 
the other way around [with affluent families select-
ing the best schools for their children and poor fami-
lies relegated to poor schools]?  When automobiles 
first came out, they were very expensive. Only the 
rich could afford them. What happens over time, 
the well-to-do provide, as it were, the experimen-
tal funds to develop an industry.  Automobiles are 
developed. The well-to-do buy them, and that pro-
vides the basis for a small industry.  The industry 
grows, it develops better techniques, it becomes 
cheaper, and now almost everybody has an auto-
mobile. Surely, there’s much less difference in the 
stratification of people buying automobiles now 
than there was, let’s say, a hundred years ago, when 
the automobile industry was just getting started. 
Again, televisions were developed in the 1930s. 
They were very expensive; only the rich bought 
them.  But now everybody has a television.  And in 
general, over history, every improvement has ben-
efited mostly low-income people. (cited in Kane, 
2003, p. 58) 
The public school was established not as a consumer 
good or a technological advancement such as the automo-
bile, but historically has served a public purpose: to prepare 
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effective citizens and, therefore, to enhance and stabilize 
the “common good.” Whether or not the automobile argu-
ment for market choice makes sense, Friedman’s theory has 
successfully captured the attention of those looking for so-
lutions to the abject failure of so many urban schools to edu-
cate far too many students. 
A focus on school choice is a focus on urban schools. 
School choice is not a significant issue in suburban or rural 
schools. Friedman’s arguments achieved persuasive power 
because many in the public schools who advocate against 
choice have not addressed the pronounced and serious prob-
lems confronting urban schools (i.e., high dropout rates and 
unacceptable racial achievement gaps in standardized test 
scores). Market advocates are seemingly winning the ideo-
logical battle for control of educational policymaking. Al-
though 48% of 89 state legislators in six states expressed 
preferences for 10 reforms other than vouchers (such as 
enhanced teacher preparation and better early childhood 
education), they still tended to accept pro-market arguments 
for school reform in urban areas (Laitsch, 2002).  Public 
schools, argue the critics, have not served urban families 
well.  Market orientations have become the political and, 
for some, the practical solution. 
Our contention is simple: Whatever reform policy is 
embraced to address the urban educational crisis must ad-
here to certain moral principles.  First, it must do no harm to 
the educational opportunities available to students and, sec-
ond, it must empower all within the educational system to 
achieve more fully to their personal potential, or in Dewey’s 
terms, “to live life to the fullest” (Cremin, 1961, p.123). 
Such principles necessarily constitute the moral foundation 
of schools paid for by the public to serve the common good. 
In the next section, we present a discussion of the real-
ity of the need for urban school reform and a discussion of 
the increased dominance of market theories in the reform 
effort. We then argue for the need for moral perspectives in 
relationship to embracing school choice program reforms. 
And, finally, specific recommendations for school choice 
are proffered that emphasize moral foundations as the core 
of any market theory for public schools. 
Urban Schools and the Emergence 
of Market Approaches 
Public education is perceived by many conservative 
critics as the domain of the public school monopoly; that 
monopoly, the critics contend, is fraught with a variety of 
common evils: inefficiency, waste, and a lack of teacher ac-
countability. 
The public schools have had opportunities to “heal them-
selves,” especially since the issuance of the A Nation at Risk 
report in 1983.  The Risk report argued for internal reforms 
(tougher coursework and higher, more flexible teachers’ sala-
ries); the conservative reformers are demanding external 
form:  choice.  Some educators used the report as a vehicle 
to argue for more resources and lower class sizes.  Conser-
vative critics are using the current “crisis” to argue for choice. 
Choice is not a new concept.  Adam Smith argued against 
monopolies as a mechanism for providing service; Milton 
and Rose Friedman (1980) “modernized” Smith’s concept 
suggesting that market forces could and should influence 
both school efficiency and teacher effectiveness.  Indeed, 
the Friedmans argued for a voucher plan that “would give 
parents at all income levels freedom to choose the schools 
their children attend” (p.188). 
Market advocates argue that by creating competition 
and giving parents options, strong schools will thrive and 
weak schools will be forced to change or close. Choice pro-
ponents argue that the way to solve the (urban) school crisis 
is to use competition to weed out weak and ineffective 
schools.  The same students who have historically had a dis-
proportionate share of unqualified teachers are now going 
to be a part of a reform experiment to see if competition can 
produce better schools with more effective teachers. 
Market theorists were so successful that in 2002 the No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) federal legislation was passed 
that proffered “public school choice” as a policy mandate. 
Specifically, schools that failed to achieve specified adequate 
yearly progress (AYP) goals must (after two years) provide 
parents with the option to transfer their children to higher 
performing public or charter schools, with priority status 
offered to the lowest achieving, low income students.  NCLB 
made real what previously had been a practical possibility 
in just selected communities.  It also opened the door to a 
wide variety of choice options that would challenge the 
“hold” of public schools on public education. 
Choice advocates place the emphasis on the private good 
and the right of each parent to exercise choice.  According 
to Halchin (1999), “As a market-based education system, 
charter schools present education as a consumer good, par-
ents as consumers and students as commodities.  The frag-
mentation of the school system, the weakening of the 
common school ethos, and explicit messages encouraging 
parents to shop around, all challenge views of education as 
a public good” (p.24).  The immediate winners and losers of 
this shift from public to private good are unclear.  Friedman 
argued that it would be the most privileged who benefited 
first (with opportunity trickle down to the poor).  The long- 
term consequences of choice for society are potentially sig-
nificant.  That is, questions arise as to whether policies on 
school choice potentially place urban school communities 
at greater risk by diminishing the capacity of urban schools 
to serve the least advantaged students (both immediately and 
in the long-term) and by undermining the morale of urban 
teachers (Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Sawhill and Smith, 2000). 
That is, does choice mitigate a collective community de-
mand to improve the schools for the “adversely selected” by 
placing too much emphasis on what fulfills personal needs? 
Choice critics assert that whether high quality “choice” 
schools will be available (the supply side) for the urban poor 
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cannot be assured through current reforms because the re-
sources (that is, the requisite number of classroom seats) 
may not be available to support the exercise of choice.  Fur-
ther, they question whether the parents with access to choice 
programs possess the requisite social, emotional and intel-
lectual resources to make good education choices 
(Robenstine, 2001).  Elmore and Fuller (1996) argue: 
…since parents and students with the least social 
capital seem also to be the ones who are least likely 
to engage in active choice, there are few demand- 
side incentives in choice programs for educators to 
engage in the deliberate design of programs that 
appeal to, and work well for, the most disadvan-
taged students.  So it seems unlikely that choice, 
by itself, will stimulate creativity and improvement 
in the development of new, more effective educa-
tional programs.  The problem seems to lie in the 
fact that the designers of choice programs have fo-
cused most of their attention, in all but a few cases, 
on demand-side issues, such as who gets to choose 
and how choices will be coordinated, rather than 
on crucial supply-side details, such as how schools 
and classroom actually differ. (p.197) 
Critics of choice assert that the market solution falls 
short in producing advantages to those most disadvantaged 
(that is, those without adequate parental advocates).  Some 
evidence to support this claim may be emerging in Great 
Britain. After two new laws were enacted in the late 1990s 
allowing parent choice, middle class Catholic parents exer-
cised choice motivated only by their private interests in what 
was good for their children (Grace, 2002). Economists such 
as Hoxby (2001) argue that the market will engender viable 
schooling alternatives and enhanced teacher quality.  The 
problem is whether more universal opportunity for all stu-
dents will emerge.  For example, there is little or no long- 
term evidence to suggest that market theory will help all 
schools perform more effectively, as is evidenced by what 
has occurred in both New Zealand (Fiske and Ladd, 2000) 
and Chile (Keller, 2001).  Just as some Eastern European 
countries may lack sufficient capital to use capitalistic prin-
ciples to ground their economies, so, too, some schools may 
be sufficiently different and insufficiently resourced as ser-
vice providers that market approaches may (within the con-
text of current resource allocations) be an inappropriate 
mechanism for enhancing quality on a broad community- 
wide scale. 
That market theories have encompassed or are capable 
of encompassing a strong moral dimension is our concern. 
Real free markets rarely exist; market capitalism in which 
all the profits and all the costs are taken into consideration 
are rare. Market advocates fail to factor in their formulas all 
the “costs” of the consequences of choice for those most in 
need of public advocates. As long as schooling is valued for 
all children, the costs of educating all children are costs the 
public must bear. The financial costs of educating both those 
who opt out of traditional public schools (by exercising 
choice) and those who are left behind in those schools (be-
cause they are unwilling or unable to exercise choice) must 
be taken into account. Further, those left behind will likely 
rachet up huge costs as it’s likely they will be left in most 
dire and desperate circumstances and with evidence of the 
greatest personal need. 
Thus far, there is little evidence that competitive mar-
ket theories include all relevant stakeholders and, therefore, 
sufficiently benefit all educational consumers. Despite 
Friedman’s trickle down dream, evidence indicates that 
markets frequently do not benefit all consumers. Markets 
have always enhanced the lives of some but, concomitantly, 
appear to be incapable of enhancing the lives of all. So far, 
economic schemes are silent on ways to adequately support 
a high quality education for both those exercising choice 
and those left behind. In any choice scheme, market theo-
ries must be built that ensure benefits for all, which is, ad-
mittedly, an enormous, perhaps impossible, challenge that 
heretofore has not been realized, creating a certain moral 
void. 
An additional consequence of the market approach is 
the wide spectrum of options created to serve children and 
families. Not all choice options may further the common 
good (i.e., prepare students to be full members in a free and 
equal democracy) because some choice options may be ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally exclusionary (e.g., an 
all-girls or all-boys school).  Assuring each child an educa-
tion for democratic citizenship is a longstanding and fun-
damental moral good. This moral good, this right of all 
children to a quality education, is built into the heritage of 
public schooling (Guttman, 2003). Those creating new 
school paradigms extol the virtues of the learning commu-
nities they are creating and the innovative ways of socializ-
ing children (Fuller, 2000), but some options fail to assure 
tolerance and equity, and to sustain the traditional values 
that schools historically have held. For example, some faith- 
based schools might restrict freedoms for groups such as 
gays and lesbians rather than guarantee unrestricted demo-
cratic liberty. 
Additionally, if market choices expand too rapidly, tra-
ditional public schools may be weakened to the point that 
the government cannot guarantee space and opportunity for 
each child, especially if and when some choice schools fail. 
Such a governmental “quality” guarantee is essential within 
a compulsory educational system and that guarantee may be 
particularly difficult to achieve in smaller cities where re-
source options are more limited. 
Many who oppose choice as a false and empty solution 
to failing urban schools call for massive investments in ex-
isting public schools.  Their bottom line is that all children 
must have access to high performing schools with excellent 
teachers and that all students need options if choice schools 
fail (Fiske and Ladd, 2000).  Unfortunately, one of the emerg-
ing NCLB problems appears to be that too few high-quality 
schools are available and proximate for students in urban 
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areas.  Brownstein (2003) writes:  “given the choice between 
the low performing school in their own neighborhood and 
the mediocre school ten miles away, [urban] parents may 
stick to the path of least resistance [and choose low per-
forming schools]” (p.48). 
Moral concerns are naturally raised by school choice 
because parent choice, believed by some to bolster the power 
of the most disenfranchised families, actually may situate 
families and students in an even more vulnerable and risky 
status. Their status as “choosers” means that the quality of 
their children’s education in urban environments is not as-
sured as it is in more privileged communities.  “Choice” is 
offered disproportionately to those most disadvantaged and 
those least well served by traditional public schools. As a 
result, charter schools, one manifestation of the reform ef-
forts, are an option for students in urban but not suburban 
schools (Finnigan, et al., 2004). Privileged parents can com-
fortably avoid the “advantages” of the market because his-
torically, more likely than not, they have been served by 
effective schools and certified teachers. The elite and the 
middle class have had less risky circumstances and they have 
had the resources to choose housing in areas that demand 
and assure high quality schools. 
The reality is that charter schools, while smaller in en-
rollment, employ fewer certified teachers than do traditional 
public schools—a 79% to 92% disadvantage (Finnigan et 
al., 2004) and were less likely than traditional public schools 
to meet state standards (Finnigan, 2004).  There is also heated 
debate regarding whether charter schools serve, proportion-
ally, students who represent the socioeconomic diversity of 
a community.  Critics of charters argue that where charters 
“fare well” (e.g., Colorado) is the result of having a dispro-
portionately lower number of poor children. 
A universal program of school competition is based on 
a premise of winners and losers and, ultimately, of losers 
being forced out of business.  Yet those schools and stu-
dents most in need may be the “losers” if market approaches 
are implemented on a widespread basis because an advo-
cacy system for the education of all children will be dimin-
ished as the personal preferences of selected parents emerge 
and the collective voice of the community is mitigated.  Wells 
(1996) conceptually plays with this idea: 
What will happen to these [high poverty] children 
in an educational free market predicated on the 
existence of both winners and losers?  Who will 
advocate for them?  Who will respond to their sense 
of injustice or their need for the security and cul-
tural familiarity of a neighborhood school?  These 
are important policy questions.  In a truly deregu-
lated system there is no guarantee and no safety net 
for these students. (p.48) 
Though the NCLB legislation is still in its infancy, there 
are early signs that it is not achieving its goals.  Although 
the legislation was intended to widen opportunities and fuel 
competitive pressures to force improvements in public 
schools, some evidence exists that the law is not fully achiev-
ing intended effects.  Brownstein (2003) observes: 
It’s not only in the largest cities where the [NCLB] 
law has fizzled.  In Cleveland, where 15,000 stu-
dents in 21 schools were eligible, just 36 children 
requested transfers in the fall semester—and, of 
those, nine eventually returned to their original; 
schools.  In Boston, where students in 65 schools 
were eligible, apparently no students have used the 
new law’s provisions to change schools.  Likewise, 
no students have moved in Dayton, Ohio, though 
10 of the district’s 25 schools were on the state’s 
list of failing schools.  In Louisville, Kentucky, 
2,900 kids in the Jefferson County Public Schools 
were eligible to transfer.  Only 180 have moved. 
(p.42-43) 
It is because of the “resistance” described by Brownstein 
that many neoconservatives are now arguing for the voucher 
option.  Vouchers are an outgrowth of the perceived failure 
of public school choice (i.e., there are an insufficient num-
ber of quality public schools). 
Undoubtedly, public and private school choice options 
are going to become an educational reality.  The salient ques-
tion is whether choice will be able to fulfill the moral obli-
gation to provide quality schooling to America’s K-12 student 
population.  Or will choice further engender social and eco-
nomic segregation and, as a result, mitigate the likelihood 
of comprehensive moral solutions? 
School Choice:  A Moral Obligation 
In this section, we attempt to lay out six moral prin-
ciples that should ground school governance. Clearly, the 
debate regarding school choice has been heated and ideo-
logical. Two perspectives have gained visibility. Conserva-
tive critics who advocate choice view the education 
establishment as a protectionist monopoly, one seemingly 
willing to tolerate mediocrity in order to preserve the status 
quo.  Educators dedicated to public schools view choice as 
a threat, one that is willing to sacrifice the educational suc-
cess of some children in order to achieve ideological goals. 
Our intention is not to suggest that either perspective is 
the best or right or most appropriate for children because 
we already know the current system has failed far too many 
young people and the choice system has still not demon-
strated that it will succeed.  Our principles are designed to 
attempt a way of thinking about markets based on the moral 
foundation that is the obligation of public education in this 
country, a profession of moral actors (Soder, 1990). 
Principle 1:  The policies and practices put into place 
must be ones that create opportunities for all students to 
succeed without engendering, intentionally or unintention-
ally, the circumstances for some students to fail. Reformers 
must aspire to a zero tolerance program for structures that 
exist as opportunities for unintentional failure.  Some stu-
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dents do choose intentionally to fail.  It is regrettable but 
true.  However, no system of education should be created 
that encourages such a choice.  The current traditional sys-
tem has fostered such choices for far too many students. And 
competition commonly operates within a framework of win-
ners and losers.  Plans must be designed in such a way that 
they preclude the kinds of loopholes that leave some chil-
dren vulnerable, leave some children behind.  For instance, 
not all educators in urban schools have effectively interacted 
with parents and adult family members of children they serve. 
Without adequate information and access, these parents and 
adult family members can find themselves ill-prepared to 
make appropriate choices for their children (Ferrero, 2003). 
These are the children that many choice programs do, in-
deed, leave behind, a consequence unacceptable in a choice 
program that integrates markets with a strong moral dimen-
sion. They are also the students who have been left behind 
in traditional educational structures.  New structures must 
“mend” the broken information and communication bridges 
between families, communities, and schools. Families can-
not make good choices absent good information about their 
children and about their schools (Ferrero, 2003). 
Principle 2:  The choice programs that emerge must 
expand beyond secular and religiously based schools.  All 
schools in a choice program supported by public money must 
practice nondiscrimination and commit to ethnic, gender, 
religious, ability (both physical and cognitive) and racial 
equity. “Choice markets” that include schools where equal-
ity, tolerance, and nondiscrimination are not fundamental 
values are flawed and will create pernicious long-term con-
sequences for American society. Some sectarian schools dis-
criminate on the basis of religion, for example. This reality 
is contrary to a central moral principle: schools that leave 
no child behind must ensure equity and militate against seg-
regative practices. 
Principle 3:  The market policies on choice (and/or any 
governance structure instituted as a result of choice schemes) 
must be structured in a way that ensures high quality sys-
tem-wide educational opportunities with no schools receiv-
ing, for whatever reasons, disproportional numbers of 
students of high poverty (see Van Lier, 2004a).  The idea is 
not new. Dewey’s writings consistently argue for such an 
approach; schools (within any community) must represent 
for each child an essential guarantee.  In Goodlad’s terms, 
the “schools represent the only means to comply with the 
law [regarding compulsory education]” (p.73) and because 
of that fact any policy must foster more universal access, 
especially for students who do not have advocates, to place, 
even unintentionally, overwhelming numbers of “adversely 
affected” students in specific schools. 
Principle 4:  The “right” to an education in any choice 
program is a right exercised by parents on behalf of their 
children.  Advocates of “parental choice” rely heavily on 
the word “parent.”  These advocates frequently decry the 
fact that parents who opt to send their children to private 
schools are (unfairly) charged double for their children’s 
education: first by their school taxes and, second, by the 
private school tuition (see discussion in Macedo, 2003). 
Education “adequate for a first-class (free and equal) citi-
zenship” is a child’s right in this country (Gutmann, 2003) 
but it is a right exercised by parents. 
Parents have no constitutional guarantee to select a 
school of choice for their child to be paid for by taxpayers. 
Hence, because of the disestablishment clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, parents who select private religious schools 
for their children are not guaranteed public financial sup-
port (Gutmann, 2003). 
From a moral perspective, some argue that parental 
power with respect to their children’s potential should not 
be unlimited in a market milieu. Swift (2004) differentiates 
between “unfair inequality” in the life chances of students 
vs. “simple inequality” in life chances. School governance 
policies necessarily will tolerate simple inequality, unfair-
ness when it is the result of legitimate parent “partiality,” he 
claims and if the “unfairness does no harm to the worst-off” 
(p. 326). Admitting that there is real inequality in status due 
to the unequal family backgrounds among children (i.e., some 
more privileged toward formal education success than oth-
ers), he argues, from principle, that this is “simple inequal-
ity.” In a market sense, he identifies an “unfair inequality,” 
as circumstances where “parents are allowed differentially 
to invest in their children’s potential-development…unfair 
if some children have their potential developed more than 
others just because of their parents’ preferences and/or ca-
pacity to act on those preferences.” (p. 326). To assure jus-
tice, schools (and communities) must, then, act in loco 
parentis to preclude the population of students they serve 
from sliding into “unfair inequality” environments. This 
moral argument is grounded in the nexus between the child’s 
right to an education and the parents’ economic power is 
relevant to the next principle as well. 
Principle 5:  Teachers and schools must ensure that all 
students, regardless of their financial wealth or personal re-
sources, receive equal access to quality schools.  School fund-
ing, community tax base, and family wealth all need to be 
taken into consideration as sources of student support. If stu-
dents are forced to attend school to ensure the public good, 
schools and teachers must treat all students of every social 
class fairly and equitably in order to assure the students’ good. 
It is somewhat ironic that the market forces that allure 
reformers are, in some sense, the same forces that explain 
the disintegration of the urban schools reformers who are 
ostensibly trying to make better. A shrinking tax base within 
large urban inner cities resulted from dramatic outsourcing 
of jobs to the outer cities, the suburbs, and then off shore. 
The move from a manufacturing to an information economy 
upended the economic base of urban areas. In addition, cor-
porate productivity is enhanced through improved efficiency, 
including lower labor costs (i.e., job losses). For instance, 
manufacturing jobs are almost nonexistent and other job 
opportunities that historically supported the jobs of urban 
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families and urban schools are gone. Corporate globaliza-
tion has changed the labor force dynamics throughout the 
country, most dramatically in urban areas. Schools supported 
by those tax dollars are increasingly vulnerable, particularly 
when schools compete with other state services for dimin-
ishing state funding as states attempt to make up for lower 
federal funding for all programs. According to Anyon (1997): 
Corporate profits flow to other countries because 
such practices go unchallenged. We have been in a 
long period of social quiescence. There has not, in 
recent years, been sufficient will to challenge fed-
eral and state policies that maximize private wealth 
while minimizing the public good. (p. 185) 
This principle, then, obligates any choice scheme to be 
one in which financial costs to urban schools will be no 
greater than the financial benefits the choice program will 
reap for those same schools. 
Principle 6:  The moral foundation of a market scheme 
is related to the role of teachers and administrators: A choice 
program must strengthen the professionalization of teach-
ing as well as bolster its moral foundation. Teaching is a 
moral act. Teachers in traditional schools are held to clear 
standards of professional conduct.  When teachers assume 
roles in the marketplace, it is imperative that they behave 
equally professional and ethical.  Some argue that choice 
might engender teacher deprofessionalization because of the 
rapid turnover of teachers in choice environments.  If true, 
what costs redound to students in particular and education 
in general because of choice reforms where the emphasis is 
somewhat singularly on student achievement as opposed to 
more generally on student success? Soder (1990) writes: 
Compulsory schooling, then, carries with it immense 
moral obligations and provides a legitimate basis for restruc-
turing teacher professionalization rhetoric…it is precisely 
because children are compelled [to attend school] and chil-
dren are defenseless and have low status that teaching has 
moral obligations and moral praiseworthiness.  (p.74) 
When schools compete for students, teachers are re-
warded for increased enrollments (and those enrollments 
result from student achievements).  Teachers’ success is 
measured by the extent to which they can account for what 
might be a record of higher test scores (what the market 
values) at the expense of equally substantive dimensions of 
the common good, for instance, providing equitable access 
to learning to poor and minority students, improving the 
quality of life in inner city neighborhoods devastated by 
poverty, and enhancing the job skills of future workers. These 
measures, while beneficial to the common good, may be 
devalued in a choice market because the emerging choice 
environment may be “value-added” oriented through a nar-
row measure of student test scores. 
The value-added concept ensures that some structures, 
some systems, and some teachers function better than oth-
ers.  High performers in market driven schools are those 
who achieve a defined goal: high test scores.  And the cen-
tral player in fostering that achievement is the teacher.  Those 
who embrace the market orientation are not concerned with 
the credentials of the teacher; they are concerned with the 
“outputs” produced by that teacher:  student achievement 
(Kanstoroom and Finn, 1999).  Outputs such as test scores 
are not readily or even reliably assessed, however.  Data 
need to be collected over several years before conclusions 
can be reached about a school’s success and even informed 
supporters of value-added approaches argue for cautions 
around how test scores are used (Promise and Peril of Using 
Value-Added Modeling, 2004).  While market systems surely 
will allow some schools to flourish with test score increases, 
others will fail and without some type of centralized over-
sight the interests of the students will not be protected. 
Policy Recommendations 
Two ideas will be proffered regarding how educators 
should respond to the current ideological tug-of-war regard-
ing choice.  First, controlled choice should become a policy 
option.  Controlled choice is not a new concept.  Al Shanker 
argued for a form of controlled choice years ago, especially 
if teachers played a central role (Chubb, 2003).  Shanker 
envisioned charter schools as a form of controlled choice, 
and they still represent an option.  But, clearly some critical 
questions have surfaced relative to the overall effectiveness 
of charters and to whether charters are educating the same 
“mix” of students evidenced in the larger communities within 
which they are located.  Controlled choice occurs when com-
munities work together to identify schools (public or pri-
vate) that meet students’ needs and transcend traditional 
political and even geographic boundaries. Controlled choice 
is important because markets are not perfect (Chubb, 2003). 
Van Lier (2004) describes what it might look like for 
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio): 
At least some outer-ring suburban parents might 
be willing to send their children to areas of Cleve-
land such as University Circle.  There, a magnet 
school could draw on resources at Case Western 
Reserve University, University Hospitals and The 
Cleveland Clinic, says Regano.  (Cleveland School 
of the Arts, a public magnet school adjacent to 
University Circle, already enrolls suburban stu-
dents.)  (p.7) 
Clearly this type of controlled choice creates complica-
tions but it also fosters real opportunities.  First, it requires 
schools and school districts to work together to identify bet-
ter educational options and, second, it necessitates the de-
velopment of more unique and innovative curricula which 
are more likely to be appropriate to the unique learning needs 
of urban students.  Urban students are rejecting some of the 
extant systemic reform educational structures.  And, com-
petition (and choice) has still not demonstrated that innova-
tion will result from enhanced choice.  That is bad news for 
students of need in high poverty contexts.  Controlled choice, 
especially when it is based on more innovative cooperative 
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structures, may actually engender the innovation that stu-
dents need because adults will be working together to ad-
dress a need rather than competing against one another to 
achieve a political or goal. 
The Dayton Early College Academy (Dayton, Ohio) is 
an example of controlled choice.  It represents a cooperative 
partnership between very different entities (a public school 
and private university) and it illustrates an entirely new cur-
riculum model for how to reach urban students, which re-
quires yet another form of cooperation between a local and a 
state educational agency.  The school is part of the public 
system even though it operates outside some of the district’s 
union agreements, which illustrate another form of coopera-
tion.  In the DECA case, cooperation brings together educa-
tional reformers with traditional educational leaders. 
Second, school districts should begin to evolve more 
loosely coupled administrative structures to ensure that all 
schools in a school district (regardless of type) are under a 
common umbrella of administrative oversight and operate 
within certain educational parameters. 
Cincinnati (Ohio) was one of the first communities to 
experiment with the “umbrella” or “portfolio of schools” 
concept.  All schools (charter and traditional public) were a 
part of the Cincinnati system, though some were more di-
rectly controlled by the school district than others.  The key 
was that the administrators for the district maintained some 
involvement over all schools so that the students were not 
adversely affected when and if a school were to fail. 
The “portfolio of schools” approach places all schools, 
regardless of type, under some type of community adminis-
trative structure.  That structure focuses on ensuring the vi-
ability of each school using various forms of accountability 
data.  Each school may have its own independent board that 
reports annually on student performance, especially as stu-
dent tests scores are compared to those of students in demo-
graphically similar situations. Such community boards would 
not function without managing at least some anticipated ten-
sion between the promises of choice (fewer bureaucratic 
constraints on instructional innovation) and the realities of 
accountability (bureaucratically established standards of 
success) (Cohen-Vogel, 2003). 
The umbrella administrative unit is essential because 
market force approaches in education work under a spuri-
ous assumption that parents are going to make good choices 
about their children’s educational opportunities.  For some 
children and some families the assumption is valid, but for 
far too many urban children it is, quite simply, not true.  Some 
children in urban environments have absolutely no (or at 
least very limited) adult oversight.  Those children need 
someone or some “body” to act as an advocate for their 
needs.  That body needs to ensure that adequate performance 
data for all schools are available and that parents have ad-
equate access to such data and that fair admissions processes 
are in place for all schools to ensure that the segregation of 
students by race or gender does not occur. 
The umbrella approach is also imperative because of 
the limited (human and financial) resources available in most 
communities. Without an umbrella structure, a variety of 
potential providers (e.g., charters, for profits) compete for 
extant resources to help with the support of their individual 
schools. Such competition focuses the energy of adults in 
opposition rather than having those energies working together 
for the benefit of all students. 
Umbrella structures are also important as a mechanism 
to ensure that well-designed educational models within a 
community evolve.  Uncontrolled choice is potentially just 
as problematic (and perhaps more so) than allowing current 
dysfunctional structures to continue.  A Brookings Institu-
tion publication explains the rationale for community over-
sight best: 
Choice programs will not be implemented easily or 
even cheaply.  The surest way to help guarantee their 
successes will be conscious, well-thought-out strat-
egies drawing on the best thinking of the worlds of 
government and philanthropy.  And perhaps the sur-
est way to encourage their failure is to implement 
choice programs quickly, carelessly, and cheaply, 
optimistic that at some point things will all work out 
for the best (School Choice, 2004, p. 36). 
A moral educational system is one where the focus is 
on the students, with adults creating structures to ensure that 
students in failing schools are not hopelessly on their own 
when problems occur or not within structures where adults 
are in a zero sum game for resources with some students 
being adversely affected because “their” adult advocates 
cannot compete successfully for educational advantages. The 
community governing unit exists as a proxy parent that en-
sures all students have advocates if and when some schools 
fail. A market theory of choice within which are embedded 
strong moral constraints is one within which all urban chil-
dren will be protected from policies or practices that limit 
their full social and intellectual development. 
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